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Non-technical summary 
The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. 
Many economic experiments have studied the determinants of cooperative behavior as 
well as the implementation of institutions to increase the voluntary contributions. 
While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions to 
public goods, many real-world examples involve situations in which subgroups of 
individuals or countries (coalitions) implement an institution to address the public 
good problem. International agreements serve as one example. Some countries may 
form a coalition to cooperate while others may free-ride on the coalition's efforts. 
Forming a coalition thereby involves (at least) two challenges: On the one hand, the 
institutional arrangement needs to attract members to the coalition. On the other hand, 
any given coalition should be able to increase the provision of the public good. In this 
paper, we compare the ability of different institutions to address these two issues by 
means of a laboratory experiment. We thereby test theory on the formation of 
coalitions and compare the resulting provision level of the public good with those 
achieved by institutions that do not allow for the formation of groups, like a voluntary 
contribution mechanism.  
Our experiment shows that only few players form a coalition and only minor 
efficiency gains result when members are required to contribute a certain amount to 
the public good. The coalition structure is better accepted when coalition members 
can negotiate about the public good provision and agree on the “smallest common 
denominator”. The experiment thereby shows that the way how terms of coalitions are 
reached matters for the acceptance of such institutions. However, the results indicate 
that not all players participate in the coalition. The coalition structure therefore suffers 
from manifesting inequality between insiders and outsiders and thereby lowers the 
willingness of coalition members to provide the public good. If, in contrast, all players 
are forced to take part in the negotiations about the smallest common denominator, 
they often achieve close to efficient public good provision level.  
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter ist häufig auf freiwillige Beiträge und 
Kooperation zwischen Individuen angewiesen. In vielen ökonomischen Experimenten 
sind die Determinanten kooperativen Verhaltens sowie Mechanismen zur Erhöhung 
der freiwilligen Beiträge untersucht worden. Während sich die meisten 
experimentellen Arbeiten auf die Analyse individueller Beiträge konzentrieren, sind 
in der realen Welt viele Situationen zu beobachten, in denen Gruppen von Individuen 
oder Ländern (Koalitionen) eine gemeinsame Institution implementieren, um das 
öffentliche Gut bereitzustellen. Internationale Vereinbarungen zum Umweltschutz 
können hierfür als Beispiel dienen. Einige Länder schließen sich innerhalb einer 
Koalition zusammen und kooperieren miteinander, während andere Länder der 
Koalition fernbleiben und Nutznießer der Anstrengungen innerhalb der Koalition 
sind. Es gibt (mindestens) zwei Herausforderungen für eine erfolgreiche 
Koalitionsbildung: Erstens muss die Institution Anreize bieten, damit genügend 
Länder der Koalition beitreten. Zweitens sollte jede Koalition in der Lage sein, die 
Bereitstellung des öffentlichen Gutes zu erhöhen. In dieser Studie untersuchen wir mit 
Hilfe eines Laborexperimentes verschiedene Koalitionsinstitutionen im Hinblick auf 
diese zwei Herausforderungen. Dabei testen wir Theorien zur Koalitionsbildung und 
vergleichen die Koalitionen mit Institutionen, in denen keine Gruppenbildung 
möglich ist. 
Die Ergebnisse unseres Experiments zeigen, dass nur wenige Spieler eine Koalition 
bilden und nur geringe Effizienzgewinne resultieren, wenn die Mitglieder einer 
Koalition gezwungen sind, einen bestimmten Beitrag zum öffentlichen Gut zu leisten. 
Die Koalitionsstruktur wird eher akzeptiert, wenn sich die Mitglieder in 
Verhandlungen auf den „kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner“ einigen können. Damit wird 
deutlich, dass die Festlegung der Regeln innerhalb einer Koalition für die Akzeptanz 
der Institution sehr wichtig ist. Doch selbst wenn die Mitglieder über den Beitrag 
verhandeln können, treten nicht alle Spieler der Koalition bei. Die Koalitionsstruktur 
führt daher zu Ungleichheit zwischen Mitgliedern und Nichtmitgliedern, die die 
Bereitschaft der Koalition, das öffentliche Gut bereitzustellen, reduziert. Wenn 
dagegen alle Spieler gezwungen sind, an den Verhandlungen über den kleinsten 
gemeinsamen Nenner teilzunehmen, erreichen sie oft ein Effizienzniveau nahe dem 
sozialen Optimum. 
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1. Introduction 
When countries got together in Copenhagen 2009 to negotiate a new climate 
agreement, diverging interest and strong free-riding incentives made it impossible to 
reach a meaningful way to address the challenge of providing the global public good 
greenhouse gas abatement. Countries struggled to debate the right way to move 
forward: to have negotiations involving all countries, to establish smaller clubs or 
coalitions that formulate their own agreements or just lower the requirements to 
achieve unanimous decisions.1 
The problem of improving institutions to provide public goods is obviously more 
general. A large literature has evolved that considers donations and the private 
provision of public goods by individuals.2 Common to this literature is the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms to internalize the external effects by public intervention. 
Instead agents (i.e. individuals or countries) have to voluntarily commit to contribute 
to the public good or to implement a specific institution. While most of the literature 
considers mechanisms that include all affected agents, many real-world examples 
hereby involve situations in which subgroups (coalitions) implement an institution to 
address the public good problem. 
International agreements serve as one example: some countries may form a coalition 
to cooperate while others may free-ride on the coalition's efforts. Forming a coalition 
thereby involves (at least) two challenges: on the one hand, the institutional 
arrangements needs to attract members to the coalition (extensive margin). On the 
other hand, any given coalition should be able to internalize the mutual benefits 
among its members, i.e. increase the provision of the public good (intensive margin). 
In this paper, we compare the ability of different institutions to address these two 
issues. We thereby experimentally test theory on the formation of coalitions and 
compare the resulting provision level of the public good with those achieved by 
                                                 
1 The Economist.com commented: “Though there was a fair bit of mess involved, and their 
achievement was far from monumental, the leaders who turned up in Copenhagen seem to have made a 
difference by finding their way to a suboptimal deal rather than none at all.” (from: “Copenhagen 
climate talks: Better than nothing”, Economist.com, December 19th,  
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15124802). Aldy and 
Stavins (2009) lay out different ways to implement future climate agreements. 
2 Following early work as summarized in Ledyard (1995), a large literature studies voluntary 
contributions to charities and explores mechanisms like rebates and matching (Eckel and Grossman, 
2003), seed money (Andreoni 1998 and List and Lucking-Reiley 2002), auctions (Goeree et al. 2005) 
or raffles and lotteries (Morgan and Sefton 2000, Landry et al. 2006).  
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institutions that do not allow for the formation of subgroups, like a voluntary 
contribution mechanism.  
Our experimental treatment is guided by a series of theoretical papers on coalition 
formation (Hoel 1992, Barrett 1994, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) that were inspired 
by theories on cartel formation (d’Aspremont et al. 1983). These authors derive rather 
pessimistic predictions: as individual players (countries) have a strong incentive to 
free-ride on the provision of public goods by others, only a few countries are 
predicted to form a coalition. Consequently, no substantial efficiency gains compared 
to a voluntary contributions mechanism are predicted. Finus and Maus (2008) suggest 
that a coalition can attract more members by lowering the public good provision 
levels required from its members. That is, an institution that only partially internalizes 
the mutual benefits among its members, may be acceptable to more players and 
thereby generate efficiency gains. This leads to a trade-off between the extensive and 
intensive margin, i.e. between the number of players agreeing to the institution and 
the degree to which they internalize their benefits and provide the public good. We 
provide a first experimental test of this literature. 
The extent to which different institutions are able to generate gains in the provision of 
the public good along the intensive and extensive margins has so far not received 
much attention in the experimental literature. McEvoy et al. (2008) experimentally 
evaluate the performance of coalitions in which members have the opportunity to 
violate their commitments and fund a third-party enforcer to maintain compliance. 
Contrary to theoretical predictions they find that member-financed enforcement 
decreases the average provision of the public good. Kosfeld et al. (2009) recently 
addressed the endogenous institution formation and show that agents are potentially 
able to voluntarily establish sanctioning institutions that improve the provision of the 
public goods, but are less likely to do so if subsets of players attempt to free-ride. 
Burger and Kolstad (2009) study the emergence of coalitions when agents have a 
discrete choice between contributing or not contributing to a public good and thereby 
cannot address the role of the intensive margin.  
In our paper, we address the ability of three different institutions to attract members. 
They all involve an initial decision of players to join or abstain from the coalition. 
They differ in the way public good provision is required from members of the 
coalition: first, we consider a setting where coalition members are exogenously bound 
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to fully internalize their mutual benefits. This treatment directly tests the coalition 
formation literature (e.g. Barrett 1994). Second, we consider if lowering the 
institutional requirements from coalition members, e.g. reducing the required public 
good provision level, can attract more members and thereby lead to efficiency gains 
(thereby testing Finus and Maus 2008). Third, we consider an institution in which 
members can each suggest a minimum public good provision level. The smallest 
suggested level is then binding for all members. This idea of players agreeing on the 
smallest common denominator closely follows many real world institutional 
arrangements. International agreements often codify uniform obligations among 
countries (Barrett 2003) and, since each participating country needs to sign and ratify 
the agreement, the player with the smallest proposal is pivotal. Any country can, 
however, voluntarily go beyond its obligations.  
We compare these different institutions on coalition formation with institutions that 
involve all players: a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) and a mechanism in 
which all players are subject to the minimum proposal institution, i.e. participation is 
exogenous. Orzen (2008) studies the latter institution in a repeated four-person public 
good game and finds that it is very effective, often reaching full efficiency in the final 
period. All our treatments consider a payoff structure that is linear in the total public 
good provision, but non-linear in the individual contributions. This specification 
allows a direct test of the above mentioned coalition formation literature. At the 
individual level, it reflects increasing marginal provision costs to the public good 
which may arise from budget constraints, i.e. decreasing marginal utility from 
numeraire consumption. 
Our experiment confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from the coalition 
formation theory: only few players form a coalition and only minor efficiency gains 
relative to the VCM result when members are required to fully internalize their 
mutual benefits. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try to reduce the free-riding 
incentives by requiring less provision from their members, cannot attract additional 
members. That is, the predicted trade-off between intensive and extensive margin 
generally fails. However, substantial efficiency gains occur from larger coalition sizes 
when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the 
smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the 
way how terms of coalitions are reached matters for the acceptance of such 
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institutions. That is, when agents have a possibility to influence the public good 
provisions requirements in a coalition, more agents are willing to enter the coalition. 
Our results are thereby in line with previous findings in the literature (e.g. Sutter et al. 
2010, Tyran and Feld 2006) that show that endogenizing institutional features 
improves upon public good provision compared to exogenously implemented 
institutions.  
However, not all players participate in the coalition. The coalition structure therefore 
suffers from manifesting inequality between insiders and outsiders and thereby lowers 
the willingness of coalition members to provide the public good. In contrast, the 
“smallest common denominator” structure frequently achieves close to efficient 
public good provision levels when it involves all players.  
Our results have implications for public policy. Forming clubs or coalitions to provide 
public goods can be beneficial compared to just relying on voluntary contributions 
from everybody. However, the terms of institutionalizing the provision requirements 
from coalition or club members are crucial for the capacity to attract members: 
following an exogenous rule that specifies the required contribution levels from 
members (full or partial internalization of benefits) is less effective in inducing 
players to join the coalition than an institution that allows potential cooperators to 
endogenously determine the rules. If agents are only bound to the smallest common 
denominator, more players are willing to accept the coalition. While these institutions 
with partial coverage can thereby generate large efficiency gains, it appears 
worthwhile to explore an institutional setting in which all agents participate in making 
minimum proposals.3 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short theory of coalition 
formation and public goods provision which generates the predictions for our 
experiment. We then report the experimental design in section 3, before we discuss 
our results in section 4. Section 5 finally concludes.  
 
                                                 
3 The institution could formally be made incentive-compatible by requiring players to deposit a bond 
covering the level of their own minimum proposal. When the smallest common denominator is 
determined the difference between this bond and the binding minimum can be returned. Agents have an 
incentive to carry out their obligations in order to regain their deposit. For a possible implementation of 
such a deposit mechanism, see Gerber and Wichard (2009).  
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2. Theory and Predictions 
We consider an economy that is populated by agents, 1,...,i n= , with utility functions 
of the form 
i iu y Qγ= +      (1) 
where iy  is a numeraire, and 1
n
jj
Q == q∑  represents the total provision level of the 
public good and γ  denotes the (constant) marginal utility from the public good. 
Subjects can allocate their initial income  to personal consumption or public good 




i iy q w+ ≤      (2) 
The utility function given by (1) and (2) is standard in the coalition formation 
literature (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Barrett 1994).4 We use this payoff structure 
to derive analytic predictions for our experiment. Throughout, we assume interior 
solutions which requires / 2w nγ≥ . 
 
Voluntary contribution mechanism and social optimum 
Individual utility maximization immediately yields the individual Nash provision 
level 2NEiq γ=  with the total contributions given by 2NEQ nγ= . It should be noted 
that the Nash equilibrium involves dominant strategy such that each individual’s 
actions do not depend on the provision levels chosen by the remaining players. The 
social optimum maximizes total payoff and is given by 2SOiq nγ=  and 
2 2SOQ n γ= .  
We now derive the equilibrium under the different coalition formation institutions. 
The standard coalition formation model (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) involves two 
stages. In the first stage, each subject decides about membership in the coalition. Let 
 be the set of players who are members of the coalition with  (S k nk ≤≤1 ) denoting 
its size. In the second stage, public good provision is chosen. Non-members are free 
                                                 
4 This specification deviates from a large part of the literature on voluntary public good provision 
which largely considers linear provision costs and implies a dominant strategy of giving zero in the 
Nash equilibrium such that any variance in the data could mistakenly be interpreted as altruism 
(Ledyard 1995). Differently, our non-linear structure generates positive Nash contributions. 
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to choose their public good provision level. Due to the assumed linearity of the public 
good, their payoff-maximizing decision does not depend on the coalition efforts and is 
again given by 2NCiq γ= . For the choice of public good provision by the members of 
the coalition, we compare different institutions.  
 
Payoff maximizing coalition (COALfull) 
If members of the coalition fully internalize their mutual benefits, the payoff-
maximizing individual provision level given coalition size  is  for all 
members of the coalition. 
k 2/)( kkqCi γ=
 
Partial internalization of benefits inside the coalition (COALpartial) 
We consider a setting where members of the coalition are not able to fully internalize 
their mutual benefits, but only internalize at a ratio of 1α ≤ . That is, the provision 
level given coalition size  is  for all members of the coalition. 
This institution has been suggested by Finus and Maus (2008). 
k 2/),( kkqCi αγα =
 
Smallest common denominator inside the coalition (COALmin) 
We finally consider an institution for negotiations inside the coalition where members 
of the coalition are requested to suggest a minimum public good provision level. After 
these minimum proposals  are received from all participating parties, the 
agreement will require all agents in the coalition to provide at least the smallest 
suggested level . That is, agents are bound to provide 
. The individually payoff-maximizing provision level at this 









min miniq q ∈≥ =
minmax , / 2q q γ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ . Note that this implies that it is 
weakly dominant to suggest a minimum provision level of min / 2iq kγ=
/ 2k
: this 
maximizes payoff if other players in the coalition suggest minjq γ≥ , suggesting a 
smaller level would potentially lower the binding minimum and hence negatively 
affect all profits. However, there are other equilibria in weakly dominated strategies: 
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any binding minimum min / 2q kγ<
k
 is established as equilibrium if at least two 
players suggest that level while other players suggest a larger minimum.  
This logic immediately implies that the minimum stage played for all players, i.e. in 
combination with a public good provision game, generates the efficient outcome in 
weakly dominant strategies. Thus, the following proposition holds:  
 
Proposition 1 
If all players are requested to suggest a minimum provision level and negotiations 
implement the smallest minimum level as a binding provision level, the social 
optimum is obtained in weakly dominant strategies. 
 
In general, however, it is doubtful that all players participate in negotiations, we 
therefore compare the above institutions for negotiations with respect to the coalition 
size that they generate. 
 
Membership game 
All these institutions for deciding the provision level inside the coalition lead to 
specific incentives of agents to join the coalition. Consequently, different coalition 
sizes may result. Specifically, we can denote the total payoff to members of the 
coalition given a coalition size of  and institution I  by , the payoffs to 
non-members by Π . Using the terminology from cartel and coalition 
formation literature (d’Aspremont et al. 1983, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Barrett 
1994), a coalition of size k  is externally stable if no player outside the coalition has 
an incentive to join, i.e. if .
( , )C k IΠ
( 1, )C k IΠ −
( , )k I
( , )NC k IΠ >
NC
( 1, )C k IΠ +
(
5  The coalition is internally stable 
if no member has an incentive to leave, i.e. if .  ,C Nk I )Π ≥
For the institutions COALfull and COALpartial we can restate known results from the 
literature: 
                                                 
5 We assume that a player would join the coalition if he or she is indifferent as this increases payoffs to 
all other agents.  
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 Proposition 2 
A coalition that is internally and externally stable satisfies 2 3 2k αα
+ −≤  but 
2 3 21k αα
+ −+ > .  
The proof involves straightforward comparison of payoffs which follow from (1) and 
(2). 
 
For the standard coalition game (COALfull) in which the coalition fully internalizes 
their mutual benefits ( 1α = ), this implies that only 3 agents form the coalition 
( ). Figure 1 shows how the predicted size of stable coalitions depends on 3k = α . 
The decreasing relation corresponds to a trade-off between intensive and extensive 
margins: For example, coalitions of 6k =  players could be stabilized for 0.5α =  
while only 3 players form a coalition when mutual benefits are fully internalized. The 
increased coalition size can thereby also generate efficiency gains, i.e. increases in 
total payoff to all agents and in the payoff to the average coalition member. The 
example of  and 6k = 0.5α =  illustrates this result: compared to the  solution 
when 
3k =
1α = , the same total provision level results while the provision efforts are 
being distributed across more players. Due to the increasing marginal provision costs, 
gains in total payoffs result.  
We now consider the institution in which members can make their minimum 
suggestion (COALmin). Since the weakly dominant strategy in the subgame following 
the membership decision involves full internalization of mutual benefits, the only 
subgame perfect equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies equals the  result in 
COALfull. However, it is not clear that agents choose the weakly dominant strategies 
in the minimum stage. Therefore, less than full internalization could result. As a 
result, different coalition sizes could be stabilized. For example, the grand coalition is 
stabilized when players choose the following subgame-perfect strategies: (i) all agents 
3k =
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coordinate on the full internalization in the grand coalition, while (ii) in all smaller 
coalitions players suggest the minimum contribution at the Nash level ( min / 2q γ= ).6  
 
Proposition 3 
In the coalition game in which negotiating parties agree to implement provision 
obligations at the smallest minimum level suggested by a member of the coalition, the 
social optimum in a grand coalition (as well as any other coalition size) can be 
stabilized in a subgame perfect equilibrium. The only equilibrium in weakly dominant 
strategies corresponds to the standard coalition game in which three members fully 
internalize their mutual benefits. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
We designed an experiment to test the different institutions on coalition formation to 
provide public goods. The treatments involved different institutions to implement a 
ten-person public good game. The payoff function for each player was given by 
 with 2 2
1
n
i i i j
q Q q qπ γ γ == − + = − + ∑ j 10=γ , 10=n  and ]100,...,0[∈iq  and was 
common knowledge.We begin with the traditional VCM as a control treatment. Three 
coalition formation treatments introduced a first “coalition stage” in which subjects 
needed to decide on participating in the institution. Decisions to join a coalition were 
made simultaneously and independently. Following this coalition stage, subjects 
played their contribution game. In treatment COALfull, the members’ contributions to 
the public good were exogenously fixed at the level that internalized their respective 
mutual benefits onto each other, while in treatment COALpartial they only 
internalized 50% of their mutual benefits, i.e. 0.5α = . Non-members in both 
treatments were free to set their contributions at any level. Treatment COALmin 
introduced an intermediate stage: after being told the number of subjects in the 
coalition, all members of the coalition negotiate about the minimum contribution that 
each member should contribute to the public good (minimum stage). Negotiations 
take the form that all participants simultaneously and independently proposed a 
                                                 
6 Coalitions that do not include all players may complicate coordination. This could for example be 
caused by inequality concerns (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Lange and Vogt 2003). 
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minimum amount between 0 and 100. The smallest proposed amount then became the 
binding lower limit for the contributions of all coalition members. Members were 
informed about all proposed minimum amounts (arranged in descending order). Non-
members did not make any decision in this stage and were only informed about the 
coalition size. In the contribution stage, members and non-members chose the amount 
of their contributions to the public good. While non-members could freely choose 
their contributions, members’ contributions were bound to provide at least the binding 
minimum. Finally, we implemented a treatment VCMmin in which all subjects took 
part in the negotiation about a minimum contribution. Players first simultaneously and 
independently proposed a minimum amount between 0 and 100. The smallest 
proposed amount then became the binding lower limit for the contributions of all 
players. Players were informed about all proposed minimum amounts (arranged in 
descending order). In the contribution stage, all players simultaneously and 
independently determined the amount of their contribution to the public good which 
had to be equal or greater than the binding minimum. Table 1 summarizes the key 
features of our experimental design and the number of participants in each session. 
The experiment was run in May and July 2009 at the MaxLab laboratory at the 
University of Magdeburg, Germany. In total, 500 students participated in the 
experiment, whereby 100 subjects took part in each treatment. No subject participated 
in more than one treatment. Sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. For each 
session, we recruited 20 subjects. Each subject was seated at linked computer 
terminals that were used to transmit all decision and payoff information. We used z-
tree (Fischbacher 2007) for programming. Once the individuals were seated and 
logged into the terminals, a set of instructions and a record sheet were handed out. 
Experimental instructions included several numerical examples and control questions 
in order to ensure that all subjects understood the games. The sessions each consisted 
of 12 rounds, the first two being practice. The subjects were instructed that the 
practice rounds would not affect earnings. At the beginning of the experiment subjects 
were randomly assigned to groups of ten. The subjects were not aware of whom they 
were grouped with, but they did know that they remained within the same group of 
players throughout the rounds (partner matching). At the end of the experiment, one 
of non-practice rounds was chosen at random as the round that would determine 
earnings with an exchange rate between Euro and token of 1:100. On average, a 
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subject earned €10.68 in the games. Additionally, all subjects received €1.00 as show-
up fee.7 
 
4. Experimental Results 
Our experimental design enables us to test our theoretical predictions regarding public 
good contribution levels across different institutions. We craft the results summary by 
both pooling the data across all periods and reporting treatment differences in the first 
five and last five periods. We later explore the effects of time on contribution 
schedules in more detail. 
Table 2 provides mean contribution and payoff levels for each of our treatments and 
Figure 2 provide a graphical depiction of the data. The first panel presents the average 
contribution levels across treatments and the second reports the resulting payoff 
average levels. As can be seen from the table and figures, contribution levels in the 
standard coalition game COALfull do not exceed those in the VCM (12.1 vs. 12.3). 
Average contributions in the COALpartial treatment are smaller (8.5) such that the 
hypothesized efficiency gains did not materialize. Combining the coalition formation 
framework or the VCM with a minimum stage, however, increases average 
contributions (14.8 and 22.1).  
These differences are confirmed by a series of Mann-Whitney tests with the average 
contribution by one group across all periods is taken as the unit of observation: VCM 
gives larger contributions than COALpartial (1% significance), less than the 
COALmin (10% significance), and less than VCMmin (10% significance). The 
standard coalition model COALfull performs worse than COALmin and VCMmin (5% 
and 10% significance, respectively). Identical comparisons follow for the average 
payoff, i.e. the efficiency level of the respective institutions (see also Table 2). We 
can therefore formulate the following result: 
Result 1: Average contribution and payoff levels in coalition formation 
game do not exceed those in the voluntary contribution mechanism 
(VCM) if the coalition fully internalizes their mutual benefits. If the 
coalition partially internalizes the mutual benefits, average 
                                                 
7 Overall, 9 out of 500 subjects earned negative payoffs in the games. In these cases, payoffs were cut 
off at zero and the subjects only received the show-up fee. 
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contributions and payoffs are even lower than those in the VCM. If 
negotiations among coalition members are facilitated through a 
smallest common denominator rule, average contributions to the 
public good increase. The smallest common denominator rule best 
facilitates public good provision when involving all agents. 
Further evidence for Result 1 can be found through a series of linear regression 
models as illustrated in Table 3. Averaged across all periods, the minimum 
institutions (VCMmin and COALmin) perform significantly better than the VCM (1% 
significance), while the partial internalization in the coalition formation structure 
leads to less contributions (1% significance). 
Figure 3 indicates that the contributions in the VCM are decreasing over time, they are 
smaller in the last 5 periods than in the initial 5 periods (see also Table 2). This 
downward trend which has been observed in many other experimental settings 
primarily for linear public goods is, however, significantly less pronounced for all 
coalition structures. In VCMmin, contributions increase over time. This effect is due 
an increase in the proposed minimum contribution levels. As suggested by the theory, 
some (but not all) groups are able to coordinate on the optimal contribution level (see 
Figure 4). 
Furthermore, when concentrating on the last 5 periods, the coalition structure 
COALfull performs better than the VCM. A Mann-Whitney test confirms that 
COALfull leads to larger contributions than VCM in the last 5 periods (10% 
significance). This suggests that predictions from the theory hold: the coalition 
formation structure which internalizes all the coalition members’ benefits provides 
small benefits compared to the voluntary contribution mechanism. However, the 
partial internalization of benefits in COALpartial does not provide any positive effect. 
Exactly the same comparisons result for the payoff levels. These findings are 
confirmed by regression results depicted in Tables 3 and 4. 
In the following, we will have a closer look at the cause of the differences. For this, 
we consider the number of agents who join the coalition. Figure 5 indicates the crucial 
differences. While the coalition in the standard coalition formation treatment 
(COALfull) include on average close to the predicted three members (3.50), this 
number is even slightly less in COALpartial (3.22). Formulating less strict provision 
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levels in the coalition therefore does not reduce free-riding incentives in a way that 
more agents join. This result directly puts into question the empirical relevance of the 
theoretical result by Finus and Maus (2008). A reduced requirement along the 
intensive margin therefore does not trigger the predicted gains along the extensive 
margin. The average coalition size increases, however, when agents are allowed to 
make their own proposals for the minimum provision in the coalition: in COALmin 
we obtain an average coalition size of 5.07 which is significantly larger than the one 
for the other two treatments (Mann Whitney, 1% significance; further evidence in 
Table 5).  
Result 2: The number of agents in the coalition is close to the 
theoretical prediction in the standard coalition formation game. An 
exogenous reduction in the provision levels required when joining the 
coalition does not enlarge the coalition. An institution in which 
coalition members can suggest their own minimum with the smallest 
suggested level being binding triggers the entry of more agents.  
Result 2 potentially provides an interesting feature of the acceptance of institutional 
requirements. In the COALmin treatment, agents can impact the coalitions’ provision 
efforts after observing the number of coalition members, i.e. the number of potential 
cooperators. This implies that they are not bound to a specific provision level just by 
showing their intent to join the coalition.8 As a consequence, the “costs” of joining 
are smaller such that we should expect more agents to join. Result 2 is consistent with 
recent findings in the literature that endogenously determined institutions are better 
accepted than exogenous rules (Sutter et al. 2010, Tyran and Feld 2006). The 
important question is, however, what level such coalition can agree upon.  
A sensible measure to assess the provision level in the coalition is the internalization 
ratio, i.e. the ratio of chosen provision effort of the coalition compared with the level 
that fully internalizes the mutual benefits of coalition members ( ). On 
average the ratio is given by 83% for the COALmin treatment and thereby lies in 
between levels in COALfull and COALpartial as illustrated in Figure 6.
)2//( 2γkqSi i∑∈
9 The 
internalization ratio does depend, however, on the size of the coalition. We depict this 
                                                 
8 For example, this can be relevant if players are inequality-averse and want to avoid large payoff 
inequalities between free-riders and coalition members (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999). 
9 Note that the internalization ratio is exogenously fixed at 1 in COALfull and 0.5 in COALpartial. 
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internalization ratio in Figure 7 for the different coalition sizes in COALmin. Figure 7 
shows that the ratio based on the average suggested minimum, the binding minimum, 
as well as the eventually chosen level are decreasing in the coalition size . This is 
confirmed by a linear regression model as reported in Table 6.  
k
Result 3: When negotiations in the coalition are institutionalized by 
each coalition member making a minimum proposal with the smallest 
suggested level being binding, the extent to which mutual benefits are 
internalized is decreasing in the size of the coalition.  
Result 3 shows a trade-off between intensive and extensive margin for the 
endogenously formed coalition. We can furthermore compare the internalization ratio 
given by the binding minimum with the ratio needed to stabilize a given coalition size 
as derived in section 2 (dashed line in Figure 7, see also Figure 1). Interestingly and 
surprisingly, the binding minimum ratio (int_min) follows closely the levels that are 
necessary to stabilize coalitions of the respective size.  
In particular, the internalization ratios for coalitions that comprise more than 3 players 
are smaller than 1 (t-test, 1% significance). That is, the coalitions do not fully 
internalize the benefits of their members. We can only speculate about the reasons: on 
the one hand, if agents are inequality-averse, they may want to avoid unfavorable 
payoff differences to free-riders and therefore suggest a lower minimum. On the other 
hand, it may be more complicated for larger coalitions to coordinate onto the optimal 
provision level as they are more susceptible to single players suggesting a small 
binding minimum.10 
 
Decision to enter the coalition 
We now have a closer look at the determinants of individual decisions to enter a 
coalition. One of the most important theoretical results is that the incentives to leave 
the coalition are the larger, the larger the coalition size is. In Table 5 we show results 
from a probit estimation model which explains the decision to join the coalition by the 
individual’s decision in the previous period as well as by the lagged coalition size. We 
                                                 
10 This is similar to the effects in VCMmin where only some groups are able to coordinate (see Figure 
4) while others do not achieve larger provision levels as some  players consistently make suboptimal 
minimum suggestions, i.e. do not play the weakly dominant strategy.  
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see that the individual’s decision is largely driven by his or her behavior in the 
previous period (1% significance). The likelihood of joining the coalition is not 
significantly influenced by the coalition size in the previous period. Additionally, 
players in the COALmin treatment are more likely to join the coalition (1% 
significance). 
For players in COALmin, the internalization ratio based on the binding minimum is 
also decisive: the larger this internalization ratio in the past period, the smaller is the 
likelihood of an agent joining the coalition (5% significance). 
Result 4: In COALmin, subjects are the less likely to join a coalition, 
the stricter the provision requirements, i.e. the larger the 
internalization ratio based on the binding minimum in the previous 
period. 
 
Decision on minimum levels 
We have shown the benefits of institutions that allow agents to first submit a 
minimum suggestion, before the smallest one will be binding for all agents. In the 
VCMmin treatment this allows agents to step by step coordinate to larger provision 
levels of the public good. In the COALmin treatment this allows agents to condition 
the coalition efforts on the information on how many agents stay outside the coalition. 
The implied reduction in the “risk” of being exploited by free-riders when joining the 
coalition allows larger coalitions to build which generate larger provision levels of the 
public good.  
A distinct prediction from the theory is that agents in both minimum treatments have a 
weakly dominant strategy to suggest the minimum which fully internalize the mutual 
benefits. We have already seen that this full internalization does not occur in our 
experimental results. We therefore finally address the question how agents’ minimum 
suggestions evolve over time. Theory would predict that agents’ minimum 
suggestions should move upward: those who propose a larger level than others have 
no effect on the binding level. By adjusting downwards, they only can bring down the 
binding minimum which would hurt their and other players’ payoffs. Those who 
suggested the binding level would have incentives to increase their suggestion since 
this can only benefit them and others. To test these adjustments over time, we define a 
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variable “change_qimin” which reflects the difference between a player’s minimum 
suggestion in the current and in the previous period. Table 7 presents the results from 
a linear regression model. We regress the change in the suggested minimum on the 
individuals’ minimum suggestion in the previous period, the previously binding 
minimum, and a dummy variably which takes the value one if and only if the agent 
was a pivotal player in the previous period, i.e. if his or her minimum suggestion was 
binding. For both treatments, agents adjust their proposals upwards (constant is 
positive, 1% significance). This adjustment is smaller for subjects who already have 
submitted larger proposals in the previous periods. In the COALmin treatment we see 
that in particular pivotal players adjust their proposal upwards. 
Result 5: On average, subjects are adjusting the minimum proposals 
upwards over time. 
This effect is particularly important since agents’ provision levels of the public good 
are (as predicted) highly sensitive to the required minimum. In fact, 40% of 
contribution decisions in VCMmin and 65% of decisions in COALmin are exactly at 
the binding minimum level. It is therefore evident that those players whose suggestion 
forms the binding minimum have a large effect on the total provision level of the 




Not just the failure of climate negotiations in Copenhagen has revealed that forming 
institutions to secure the provision of global public goods is a complicated endeavor. 
The success of an institution to overcome free-riding incentives depends on two 
interlinked challenges: on the one hand, the institutional arrangements need to attract 
signatories, i.e. coalition members (extensive margin). On the other hand, any given 
coalition should be able to internalize the mutual benefits from the public good among 
its members (intensive margin). 
In this paper, we tested different institutions with respect to their ability to succeed 
along these two dimensions. Our experimental results show, one the one hand, that 
institutions that exogenously force members to fully internalize their mutual benefits 
generate a rather low participation rate, just as theoretically predicted. The resulting 
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provision levels of the public good do hardly go beyond the ones achieved by a purely 
voluntary contribution mechanism. On the other hand, lowering the degree of 
internalization of benefits within the coalition does not attract more members and, 
accordingly, cannot generate efficiency gains.  
We further showed that institutions that allow members to endogenously determine 
the terms of the agreement may attract more members. We thereby add to the recent 
literature on beneficial endogenous choices of rules in social dilemma situations (e.g. 
Sutter et al. 2010, Tyran and Feld 2006). In particular, we show the success of a very 
simple negotiation rule: each coalition member can suggest a provision level, 
knowing that the smallest suggested level is binding for all coalition members: this 
rule generates larger coalition sizes and average contributions. Efficiency gains 
therefore result along the extensive margin. This generates a clear tradeoff between 
extensive and intensive margin: the larger the (endogenously determined) 
requirements from coalition members were in the previous period, the less willing 
subjects are to enter the coalition, i.e. the negotiations.  
The principle of the smallest common denominator reflects many real world 
institutional arrangements which often implement uniform obligations. Coordination 
on large provision levels, however, does not always happen and also requires time: 
the largest benefits from coordinating on larger minimum proposals occur in the last 
periods. 
This may suggest that over time coordination may also occur in international 
negotiations, for example on climate policy. However, despite the relative success of 
the smallest common denominator rule in our experiment, experience from the field 
(e.g. Barrett 2003) shows that such rules may also lead to weak agreements. Reasons 
may involve the heterogeneity of countries with respect to wealth as well as to costs 
and benefits from the public good which may aggravate the coordination on a uniform 
binding minimum. The experimental investigation of the impact of such 
heterogeneities on coalition formation and on the performance of the different 
institutions and their possible adjustments are fruitful areas of further research. 
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Table 1: Summary of experimental design 
Treatment Stages Coalition 
structure 

















yes 10 10 100
VCMmin minimum 
contribution 




Table 2: Summary statistics for all treatments 
Treatment q  π  k  eff  
Total 
VCM 12.3 905.2  0.21 
COALfull 12.1 959.3 3.5 0.24 
COALpartial 8.5 727.1 3.2 0.12 
COALmin 14.8 1060.1 5.1 0.29 
VCMmin 22.1 1418.6  0.47 
First 5 periods 
VCM 15.7 1098.4  0.31 
COALfull 13.3 1030.1 3.7 0.27 
COALpartial 9.0 766.1 3.1 0.14 
COALmin 16.3 1160.1 5.3 0.34 
VCMmin 16.8 1187.9  0.35 
Last 5 periods 
VCM 8.9 711.9  0.12 
COALfull 10.9 888.5 3.2 0.20 
COALpartial 7.9 688.1 3.3 0.11 
COALmin 13.4 960.1 4.8 0.24 
VCMmin 27.5 1649.2  0.58 
Notes: q = average contributions, π  = average payoffs, k  = average coalition size,  
eff  = average efficiency defined as )/()( NESONE ππππ −−  with NEπ  =475 and SOπ =2500 
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Table 3: Linear regression of public good contributions for all treatments 
 All per. All per. Last 5 per. 
VARIABLES qi qi qi 
    
COALfull -0.202 -2.420*** 2.016*** 
 (0.578) (0.796) (0.780) 
COALpartial -3.826*** -6.702*** -0.950 
 (0.578) (0.796) (0.780) 
COALmin 2.551*** 0.582 4.520*** 
 (0.578) (0.796) (0.780) 
VCMmin 9.833*** 1.046 18.62*** 
 (0.578) (0.796) (0.780) 
per6_10  -6.880***  
  (0.796)  
per6_10_COALfull  4.436***  
  (1.126)  
per6_10_COALpartial  5.752***  
  (1.126)  
per6_10_COALmin  3.938***  
  (1.126)  
per6_10_VCMmin  17.57***  
  (1.126)  
Constant 12.30*** 15.74*** 8.858*** 
 (0.409) (0.563) (0.551) 
    
Observations 5000 5000 2500 
    
Notes: Random effects estimation, standard errors in parentheses,  
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
qi = subject’s contribution, 
COALfull = 1 if subject played in the COALfull treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALpartial = 1 if subject played in the COALpartial treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALmin = 1 if subject played in the COALmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
VCMmin = 1 if subject played in the VCMmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
per6_10 = 1 for the last five periods, 0 for the first five periods, 
per6_10_*treatment* = interaction term of time dummy and treatment dummy. 
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Table 4: Linear regression of payoff levels for all treatments 
 All per. All per. Last 5 per. 
VARIABLES pay pay pay 
    
COALfull 54.16 -68.28 176.6*** 
 (34.06) (47.30) (46.48) 
COALpartial -178.1*** -332.3*** -23.77 
 (34.06) (47.30) (46.48) 
COALmin 154.9*** 61.70 248.2*** 
 (34.06) (47.30) (46.48) 
VCMmin 513.4*** 89.52* 937.3*** 
 (34.06) (47.30) (46.48) 
per6_10  -386.5***  
  (47.30)  
per6_10_COALfull  244.9***  
  (66.89)  
per6_10_COALpartial  308.6***  
  (66.89)  
per6_10_COALmin  186.5***  
  (66.89)  
per6_10_VCMmin  847.8***  
  (66.89)  
Constant 905.2*** 1,098*** 711.9*** 
 (24.09) (33.44) (32.87) 
    
Observations 5000 5000 2500 
    
Notes: Random effects estimation, standard errors in parentheses,  
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
pay = subject’s payoff level, 
COALfull = 1 if subject played in the COALfull treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALpartial = 1 if subject played in the COALpartial treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALmin = 1 if subject played in the COALmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
VCMmin = 1 if subject played in the VCMmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
per6_10 = 1 for the last five periods, 0 for the first five periods, 
per6_10_*treatment* = interaction term of time dummy and treatment dummy. 
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Table 5: Probit estimation of decision to join the coalition for all coalition treatments 
 All coal COALmin 
VARIABLES ci ci 
   
ci_lag 1.169*** 1.381*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0979) 
k_lag 0.0249 -0.0167 
 (0.0213) (0.0286) 
meanqi_lag -0.00658  
 (0.00627)  
COALpartial -0.0391  
 (0.0685)  
COALmin 0.241***  
 (0.0687)  
int_ratio_min_lag  -0.236** 
  (0.103) 
Constant -0.875*** -0.480*** 
 (0.0842) (0.170) 
   
Observations 2700 900 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
ci = 1 if subject joined the coalition, 0 otherwise, 
ci_lag = 1 if subject joined the coalition in the previous period, 0 otherwise, 
k_lag = coalition size in the previous period, 
meanqi_lag = mean group contribution in the previous period, 
COALpartial = 1 if subject played in the COALpartial treatment, 0 otherwise, 
COALmin = 1 if subject played in the COALmin treatment, 0 otherwise, 
int_ratio_min_lag = previous period internalization ratio based on the binding 
minimum. 
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Notes: Random effects estimation, standard errors in parentheses,  
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
int_ratio_min = internalization ratio based on the binding minimum, 
k = coalition size, 
period = period. 
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Table 7: Linear regression of the adjustment in the individual minimum proposal 








 COALmin VCMmin 
VARIABLES change_qimin change_qimin 
   
qi_min_lag -0.349*** -0.363*** 
 (0.0625) (0.0283) 
q_min_lag -0.236** 0.0118 
 (0.0949) (0.0317) 
pivot_lag 5.174* -0.477 
 (2.785) (1.515) 
Constant 15.86*** 18.28*** 
 (2.915) (1.405) 
   
Observations 344 900 
R-squared 0.237 0.201 
Notes: OLS estimation due to lagged explanatory variables, standard errors in 
parentheses, significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Definition of variables: 
change_qimin = subject’s minimum proposal minus proposal in the previous period, 
qi_min_lag = subject’s minimum proposal in the previous period, 
q_min_lag = binding minimum in the previous period, 
pivot_lag = 1 if subject suggested binding minimum in the previous period, 0 
otherwise. 
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Figure 1: Internalization factor α  needed to stabilize a given coalition size 
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Figure 4: Binding minimum in VCMmin for each group over time 
 
Figure 5: Average contribution levels among coalition members and free-riders as 
well as average coalition size across treatments 










































Figure 7: Average internalization ratios conditional on coalition size in COALmin: 
suggested minimum ratio (int_qimin), binding minimum ratio (int_min), chosen 
fraction of mutual benefits that are internalized in coalition (int_qi); the dashed line 
(int_needed) shows the internalization ratios theoretically required to stabilize the 
respective coalition size. 
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Appendix 
Experimental instructions for the COALmin treatment 
 
Instructions 
Welcome to the Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory MAXLAB! 
Please read these instructions carefully and should you have any questions please 
signal us by opening the door or a show of hands. In the laboratory experiment you 
are taking part in, you can win money depending on your decisions and the decisions 
of your fellow players. Your payout from the experiment will be calculated in 
LabDollars (LD). The conversion rate between € and LD is 1:100, i.e. 100 LD are €1. 
All your decisions made the experiment will remain anonymous. Only the 
experimenter will know your identity, but your data will be treated confidentially. 
Rules of the game 
Now you will learn more about the rules of the game you will be participating in. 
Altogether 10 players take part in the game, so besides you there are 9 more players. 
Every participant faces the same decision making problem. Your task in the game, 
and also your fellow players’ task, is to decide how many points you would like to 
contribute to a joint project. Your payout will be calculated as follows: 
Your payout = −(your contribution to the project)2 + 10⋅(sum of all contributions of 
all players to the project) 
Example: If all other players have contributed an amount of 90 points to the project 
and you contribute an amount of 10 points, then your payout will be: 
− (10)2 + 10⋅(10+90) = 900 LD 
If, however, all other players contribute a total amount of 50 points and you do not 
contribute anything, your payout will be: 
− (0)2 + 10⋅(0+50) = 500 LD 
To simplify the calculation of your payout, you will find an excel-file called 
“Simulator” on your screen. You can enter your contribution and the average 
contribution of all other players and so quickly determine your payout. 
There are two stages in this game. In stage 1 you can decide whether you want to 
become a member of a coalition, i.e. if you want to join a coalition or not. Should you 
decide that you want to join a coalition you additionally can decide which amount 
should be the minimum amount each member of the coalition should contribute to 
the project. Also all other members of the coalition can state their desired minimum 
amount. The members will be informed about the proposals for the minimum amount 
of all members. If you are member of a coalition, stage 2 will be to decide for 
yourself which amount you want to contribute. In this decision the smallest minimum 
amount of all members will form your lower limit of contribution. If you have 
decided not to join a coalition, stage 2 for you will be to state your contribution to the 
project without any limitation. 
The game consists of 10 separate rounds in each of which you will play the same 
two-stage game. The nine other players you will interact with will be the same in 
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every round. If the experiment is complete you will receive the payout of one of the 
rounds in € (according to the conversion rate stated above). The round to be paid out 
will be determined randomly. This means you should behave in each round as if it 
were the round relevant for payout. In the beginning, two trial rounds will be played 
which are not relevant for payout. Independent of the course of the game you will 
receive €1 for your participation.  
 
Control questions 
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please answer the 
following control questions (hint: use the simulator). 
1. Please assume your contribution to the project is 10 points and the average 
contribution of all the other players is 15 points. How much LD will be your 
payout of this round? 
My payout is: _______ 
2. Please assume the average contribution of all other players is 5 points, which 
of the following amounts will result in the highest payout for you? 
O 5 points O 10 points  O 20 points  O 30 points 
3. Please assume you want to maximise your payout, does it make sense to not 
contribute at all (meaning zero points) to the project? 
O yes O no 
4. Please assume you and three other players have joined a coalition and all 
members have stated the following minimum contribution: 4, 88, 22, 56. In 
which range does your contribution to the project have to be? 
More than or equal ____ and less than or equal _____. 
5. Is it possible that a member of a coalition has to contribute more than he 
proposed as his minimum contribution?  
O yes O no 
6. Please assume all players chose the same amount, which of the following 
contributions results in the highest payout for all players (please check the 
according box)? 
O 10 points O 30 points O 50 points O 70 points O 100 points 
 
If you have answered all questions, please signal us. We will then check your 
answers. The game begins when all participants in the experiment have successfully 
completed the test. 
Good luck in the experiment! The MaXLab-Team 
